The City Of Evanston Has Moved To Dismiss Fitton's Nonsense On Jurisdictional Grounds, In Chicago. It Will Prevail, After A Short Discovery Period.

As we said, none of the recruited "plaintiffs" ever applied for a grant. None of them even own property or live, in Evanston. The program required that, as a point of eligibility. And the statute of limitations has long run, on any § 1983 action -- since the application process closed in November of 2021.

This depraved, tired and bitter attempt to create a supposed 2024 election wedge issue will now be dumped out of federal court in Chicago (also as we predicted). Here's the well-pled motion -- and here is the affidavit that supports it. There is zero chance Fitton or Svenson can come up with any showing to get around a dismissal (and the assessment of opposing atttorneys fee awards, in favor of Jenner & Block!), now. Let's listen in, shall we?

. . .Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is proper because Plaintiffs lack standing to sue. The Complaint contains insufficient, conclusory allegations of injury. For example, Plaintiffs assert they are “able and ready” to apply to participate in Evanston’s Local Reparations Restorative Housing Program (the “Program”), but they did not apply to participate in the Program and the application period closed in November 2021. Plaintiffs also do not allege they have property in Evanston. As a result, they are not eligible to participate. This means the Plaintiffs have not suffered a concrete and particularized injury and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. . . .

As established above, the Court can resolve this case through dismissal based on jurisdictional and timeliness issues alone before the Court gets to the constitutional merits of the Program. And, if there are constitutional and non-constitutional grounds to resolve a case, a court should resolve the case on non-constitutional grounds. See Stern v. U.S. Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1342 (7th Cir. 1977) (taking note of the “well-established rule that the federal courts ‘will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.’”) (quoting Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)).

However, the Program is an appropriate remedy to address the past racial discrimination that Evanston acknowledges it perpetuated against its Black residents. See ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10. And, Evanston stands ready to support the Program if the case moves past the jurisdictional and timeliness hurdles here. Indeed, remedying past intentional discrimination is a recognized compelling state interest. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (stating that “our prior cases . . . have recognized . . . . the compelling interest of remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination”). Furthermore, the Program is narrowly tailored to provide modest relief to those who (1) directly suffered from this acknowledged intentional discrimination, (2) are the direct descendants thereof, or (3) have evidence they suffered other housing discrimination after 1969.

Accordingly, the Program is constitutionally sound. Should this case proceed beyond the issues raised in this Motion, Evanston will address the constitutionality of its Program in future motion practice. . . .

Onward -- grinning, ear to ear. Now you know.

नमस्ते