Well put, Mr. Sean Hecker. Here's the eight pager of. . . scorching fire. And at the bottom, here, I'll drop a link to the Noemite nonsense, of yesterday. But this correctly states the well-settled law of the case. Do read it all -- but these bits offer the pointy ends, of the considerable spears:
. . .Once again, the government has responded to a Court order with which it disagrees by pretending it doesn’t exist. Mr. Abrego moved for sanctions based on senior DHS official Gregory Bovino’s flagrant violation of this Court’s October 27 Order (Dkt. 183, the “Order”) governing extrajudicial statements relating to this case. (Dkt. 271). The government’s brief opposing that motion largely ignores the Order. The government focuses instead on the underlying Local Rule -- which it claims is inapplicable -- and contends, frivolously, that Mr. Bovino’s highly prejudicial, inflammatory statements were necessary to “protect” the government from recent public statements made in connection with Mr. Abrego’s immigration proceedings. (Dkt. 282 at 4). . . .
The government largely ignores that Mr. Bovino’s statements independently violated the Order. And in any case, neither he nor the government was free to simply disregard that clear Order based on their disagreement with it. . . .
[G]eneralized comments made by Mr. Abrego about the injustice of his unlawful deportation and the government’s continued efforts to detain him do not entitle the government to smear him as “an MS-13 gang member” and “a wife-beater,” to declare that he is guilty of being “an alien smuggler,” or to describe judges as “activist” and “extremist.” Statements by CASA volunteers, United States Congressmen, and Mr. Abrego’s civil attorneys do not violate Local Criminal Rule 2.01(a) or the October 27 Order because they are not “partners and employees” of “the law firm and government agencies or offices” involved in this case, L. Crim. R. 2.01(a)(4), and are therefore not subject to the Rule. . . . Mr. Abrego, as a “criminal defendant awaiting trial in a controversial case,” has a strong interest in “replying to the charges and to the associated adverse publicity” created by the government. See United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 1987); see also id. at 600 (“To the extent that publicity is a disadvantage for the government, the government must tolerate it.”). If the government incorrectly thought the Rule was violated, its remedy was to file its own motion, not to have a senior official engage in bad-faith self help. The government knows better, even if its hyperbolic opposition suggests otherwise. . . .
Mr. Bovino went on to describe the judges presiding over Mr. Abrego’s civil and criminal cases as “activist” and “extremist.” Indeed, the government doubled down on those baseless accusations -- and again violated the Order -- when it complained publicly about Mr. Abrego’s motion. . . .
The government’s assertion that “the Judicial Branch…may not direct Executive Branch speech” because it is “not politically accountable to the electorate” (Dkt. 282 at 7 n. 14) might make for good press sound bites but ignores settled Supreme Court precedent that courts have “an affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity,” Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979); see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361, 363 (1966), and are equipped to strike a “constitutionally permissible balance” between the First Amendment and the right to a fair trial, Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075, as this Court has done. . . .
Indeed -- onward, to a better -- more just -- tomorrow, down in Music City. Thank you, USDC Judge Waverly Crenshaw -- you are the best of what America is all about. [Here is the Noemite nonsense, just to preserve a complete record.]
नमस्ते
No comments:
Post a Comment