The plaintiffs have very rationally laid down the applicable black letter federal law -- and it does not faover Bovino's "hail mary" mandamus gambit -- on a check-in provision he himself agreed to -- after asking for modification -- and the court modifying it, and the court thereby compromising with him. Here's the forceful counter-punch -- you should go read all 25 pages -- it is all worth the education:
. . .The district court’s administrative requirement is well within its power. District courts are vested with ample discretion to ensure compliance with their orders. “[T]he power of a court to make an order carries with it the equal power to punish for a disobedience of that order, and the inquiry as to the question of disobedience has been, from time immemorial, the special function of the court.” In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594 (1895). Should a person’s actions result “in noncompliance with a legitimate order of the court respecting pleading, discovery, the presentation of evidence, or other matters, he will be exposed to the same sanctions as any other uncooperative party,” and a “federal court has at its disposal an array of means to enforce its orders.” Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 827 (1996).
This power includes the discretion to set hearings, to order parties to appear before the court, and to craft appropriate remedies to ensure compliance with the law. See, e.g., Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Room, 541 F.3d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 2008). . . .
This discretion is at its apex when it comes to ensuring compliance with orders that remedy unlawful activity. Mac Naughton v. Harmelech, 932 F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir. 2019) ( “The whole system would collapse if parties could always disregard orders they disagree with.”). As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “federal courts are not reduced to issuing injunctions against” the government “and hoping for compliance.” Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690 (1978). . . .
[W]hen a court has doubts about whether defendants are complying with an injunctive decree, it is entirely proper to hold hearings and closely monitor the defendants’ conduct. Id. at 681-85. Lower courts are typically afforded many tools to ensure that parties to the litigation respect their rulings. Id. at 690; see also In re Debs, 158 U.S. at 594; Ramirez v. T&H Lemont, Inc., 845 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[A] court has the inherent authority to manage judicial proceedings and to regulate the conduct of those appearing before it”). Relatedly, district courts have the “inherent” power to hold parties in contempt, and as a necessary corollary they can conduct the fact-finding necessary to make contempt findings. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991).
The district court is exercising precisely these powers in this case. Plaintiffs presented the district court with six notices in a two-week span providing video, photo, and testimonial evidence that Defendants were continuing to violate the TRO. Doc. Nos. 57, 88, 90, 94, 118, 140. These notices included evidence that Defendant Bovino himself had violated the district court’s orders. Doc. Nos. 89, 90, 94. Defendants, meanwhile, did not submit any countervailing evidence. . . .
In short, there is no reasonable basis to argue that the court is micromanaging Defendant Bovino, let alone the Executive Branch. . . .
Indeed. Now the Seventh Cir. should quickly rule that the stay is lifted -- and the Judge Ellis has inherent authority to use reporting (after his shift ends) as a means to monitor and enforce her TRO. She is gathering evidence -- as a trial court judge. If he is behaving lawfully, the evidence will show it, and the TRO will expire. If he is not -- she may well jail him, after all these warnings -- to make the point clear, to him.
This is one TRO he repeatedly and personally violated, and thus he agreed in open court, and under oath -- to daily check ins, on all "incidents" [See the 10.28.2025 transcript in the public reference room of the Dirksen Building.] Onward.
नमस्ते
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