Kristi Noem Has Sealed Her Motions In Nashville -- But Mr. Abrego Garcia Is Letting The World Read His Answers, Now. Check It Out.

Welp. This will be a banger. Count on it Friday -- even if I don't hop a jet to go watch it, live -- Men in Black style. . . I will post one (at least) on it.

And honestly, I don't give a hoot that Noem / Tangerine 2.0 is trying to hide the things they've done (with at least five sealed filings today). The truth will out on Friday -- for certain. And like Mr. Khalil just did -- Mr. Abrego Garcia is likely to make bail -- and be headed home to Maryland, shortly. [The charges may even be wholesale dismissed, by the able judge -- on "fruit of the poisonous tree" grounds -- in a few weeks, summarily.] Here's the latest, unsealed portion:

. . .With no legal process whatsoever, the United States government illegally detained and deported Kilmar Abrego Garcia and shipped him to the Center for Terrorism Confinement (CECOT) in El Salvador, one of the most violent, inhumane prisons in the world. The government now asks this Court to detain him further. As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held, the government’s treatment of Mr. Abrego Garcia “should be shocking not only to judges, but to the intuitive sense of liberty that Americans far removed from courthouses still hold dear.” Abrego Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-1404, 2025 WL 1135112, *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025). Mr. Abrego Garcia asks the Court for what he has been denied the past several months -- due process. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142, as well as basic principles of fairness, this Court should deny the government’s motion. . . .

As the Supreme Court recognized nearly four decades ago, “liberty is the norm” in “our society,” and “detention prior to trial” – “or without a trial” – “is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). Consistent with that understanding, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (BRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq., permits pretrial detention only when the government proves: (1) that the defendant’s “case. . . involves” one or more of the circumstances listed at § 3142(f); and (2) that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance (and, in some cases, “the safety of any other person and the community”). 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), (g); United States v. White, No. 3:21-MJ-04070, 2021 WL 2155441, at *4-5 (M.D. Tenn. May 27, 2021). . . .

This means that, if the defendant’s case does not involve one of § 3142(f)’s enumerated circumstances, the government is not entitled to a detention hearing, and the Court cannot detain the defendant. Id. (noting that, if none of the § 3142(f) “circumstances are. . . present, a detention hearing (and, thus, detention) is simply unauthorized”); United States v. Hardon, 149 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1998) (vacating detention order because none of the circumstances described at § 3142(f) existed); United States v. Mendoza-Balleza, 420 F. Supp. 3d 716, 718 (E.D. Tenn. 2019) (same). Here, perhaps recognizing that it failed to address § 3142(f)’s threshold inquiry in its opening motion (DE 8), the government filed a supplemental brief (DE 14) arguing that it’s entitled to a detention hearing for three reasons. None have merit. . . .

Onward, to Friday's bail hearing -- in downtown Nashville (very near the Gulch). Grin.

नमस्ते