And Mr. Abrego Garcia's arguments are marching him nearer and nearer -- to bail, and a trip home to Maryland. As it should be for any non-violent civil defendant. And the immigration matter is undoubtedly. . . a civil one. Here's the latest from his able counsel, just filed an hour ago -- and a bit of it:
. . .Because the government’s knee-jerk motions are premature and its motion to stay fails even to grapple with the four-factor test for determining whether a stay of release is appropriate, the motion to stay should be denied and the Court should set a briefing schedule on the government’s motion for revocation.
First, the government’s motions are premature, because there is not yet a release order to stay or revoke. No conditions of release have yet been set, and it is therefore impossible to consider whether any as yet unimposed conditions are insufficient to reasonably assure Mr. Abrego’s appearance and the safety of the community under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). As a result, despite its conclusory statements to the contrary, see ECF 45 at 1; ECF 46 at 3 & n.1, the government’s motions are not yet ripe for the Court’s review.
Second, even assuming Judge Holmes’s opinion could be stayed, the government does not even purport to apply the correct test for determining whether such a stay is proper. The government appears to take the position that if it disputes the Court’s view of the evidence, then it is entitled to a stay. But the Bail Reform Act contains no automatic stay provision. United States v. Abass, No. 25 Cr. 79, 2025 WL 1096795, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2025); see also United States v. Pavon-Andino, No. 25 Cr. 66, 2025 WL 446143, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 10, 2025) (“The government’s request [to stay an order of release] was without a legal basis, citing only to the general legal principle that the government may appeal this Court’s decision to the district court under 18 U.S.C. § 3145.”). Because a stay is “an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review,” it is not granted “as a matter of right.” Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 593 (6th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, courts apply the traditional four-factor balancing test to determine whether a stay of a release order is appropriate: “(1) whether the petitioner ‘has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits’; (2) whether the petitioner ‘will be irreparably injured absent a stay’; (3) whether issuance of a stay will ‘substantially injure’ other interested parties; and (4) ‘where the public interest lies.’” United States v. Fox, No. 17-3673, 2017 WL 11546291, at *1 (6th Cir. July 5, 2017) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2009)); see also United States v. You, No. 20-5390, 2020 WL 3867419, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 2020). Applying the correct test, the government’s arguments fail. . . .
Now you know -- again. Onward, resolutely -- to Wed. aft., in Music City. Grin.
नमस्ते
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