Denials of service based on race never required arrests, in order to have standing to assert the humiliation, in a court of law. So here, too. The ruby red Sixth Circuit majority is plainly wrong on controlling law (and they contradict prior holdings in their own circuit -- as well as the Supremes). And the Supremes will say so.
We will quote from the dissent, in the Sixth Circuit, for it is very much akin to what the Supremes will ultimately rule:
. . .MATHIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. A bedrock principle of our democratic republic is the protection of unorthodox expression. The freedom to convey one’s ideas -- no matter how unpopular -- was seen as inalienable to the human experience, and the Framers of our Federal Constitution believed such freedom was “essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance.” Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). It is altogether fitting that they chose to enshrine it atop our Bill of Rights as a “fixed star in our constitutional constellation”: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” See 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570, 584 (2023) (quotation omitted); U.S. Const. amend. I.
Of course, these protections are not absolute. The Supreme Court has “long recognized that the government may regulate certain categories of expression consistent with” the First Amendment. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003). But the Constitution does not avert its eyes merely because a law mentions such a category. . . .
The majority finds that FOG lacks standing to sue Mulroy. Because Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent dictate a different result, and because the part of the AEA that FOG has standing to challenge is an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech, I respectfully dissent. . . .
The district court erred in enjoining Mulroy from enforcing the public-property provision of the AEA, Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1407(c)(1)(A), because FOG lacked standing to challenge that provision. But the district court did not err in enjoining Mulroy from enforcing Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1407(c)(1)(B) because that provision is a content-based restriction on speech that fails strict scrutiny. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting Mulroy from enforcing that unconstitutional law in Shelby County.
FOG had standing to bring this action against Mulroy. And the AEA is an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech. Therefore, I would affirm the district court’s decision to enjoin Mulroy from enforcing Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1407(c)(1)(B) in Shelby County.
I respectfully dissent.
Onward. Discouraging -- but onward, just the same. These Tangerine courts will grow weary of being slapped down by the highest court, in time. But it does take time -- and taxpayer money. Damn.
नमस्ते
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