And... What Texas Gets Wrong -- About Two Supremes' Cases, Decided This Past Week...

Last week, the Supremes decided two cases. . . in wildly different circumstances (veterans' benefits, for example) that have literally nothing to do with Texas's open violation of the federal immigration schemes (of a half-century's standing, now).

But that "super genius" Ken Paxton (MAGA TX AG) told the Fifth Circuit on Thursday, that these two cases mean. . . Texas should win in the SB-4 / Razor Wire Barrier cases.

That's. . . simply. . . unhinged.

So the ACLU (for the asylees' groups in Texas) said so, thus -- just last night:

. . .Neither of Texas’s supplemental authorities help its case. DeVillier v. Texas declined to decide whether a person may sue under the Takings Clause because it found Texas law provided a cause of action. The decision has no bearing here. DeVillier involved a claim for “just compensation.” 2024 WL 1624576, at *2. The Court explained that such a “damages” remedy “is legal, not equitable,” and so prior Takings Clause cases permitting “equitable claims” for “injunctions” were inapposite. Id. at *3. Here, plaintiffs seek only equitable relief. That makes all the difference. Crown Castle Fiber, L.L.C. v. City of Pasadena, 76 F.4th 425, 434 (5th Cir. 2023) (“But Crown Castle is not asking for damages here. The company seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, bringing the suit in equity.”).

In Labrador v. Poe, the Supreme Court issued a partial stay of an injunction against an Idaho law. There is no opinion for the Court, only a summary order. See 2024 WL 1625724, at *12 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). And the Justices’ separate opinions have little relevance here. Poe involved a statewide injunction based on harm to two individual children. Id. at *2 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). The crux of the dispute was whether the need to protect those individuals’ anonymity warranted statewide relief. See id. at *13 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (explaining this “fact-specific reason” for affording statewide relief); id. at *4 n.2 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (suggesting the district court should have considered “the adequacy of less intrusive” relief to address anonymity concerns). Here, unlike in Poe, the United States is a plaintiff harmed by every application of S.B. 4.

And, even apart from that, Texas (suggesting the district court should have considered “the adequacy of less intrusive” relief to address anonymity concerns). Here, unlike in Poe, the United States is a plaintiff harmed by every application of S.B. 4. And, even apart from that, Texas has never even tried to explain how something less than a statewide injunction would provide complete relief for the Las Americas plaintiffs -- two organizations and a municipality harmed by the systemic application of S.B. 4....

In any case, Texas waived any argument on appeal for plaintiff-specific relief by failing to brief it. See Lozovyy v. Kurtz, 813 F.3d 576, 580 n.2 (5th Cir. 2015) (“because this argument was not raised in Lozovyy’s initial brief, it is waived”). . . .

For the record, here is the feds' version of the same argument. It is every bit as persuasive, and makes much the same point: AG Paxton. . . cannot read, for comprehension. [Where did AG Paxton get his law degree? DeVry? DAMNATION.]

Actually, it was Virginia -- but that fine University should rescind his degree, on these papers alone.

Out.

नमस्ते