Let's cover a bit of the second Carroll case. She is likely to win five times the damages in this second trial as she won in the first one -- that was $5 million. Then Tangerine doubled down on his lying attacks on her -- related to his sexual assault of her.
So now he faces far larger boxcar numbers, before the jury. With closings set for Tuesday, let's look at Tangerine's conduct: as ever, he tries to tar his accuser rather than admit a jury has already determined he committed the sexual assault, and then lied about it in public to harm Ms. Carroll. Do read all five pages:
. . .[Trump] has made repeated comments about trial evidence within earshot of the jury. . . he has sought to develop the public narrative that the Court is not “allowing [Trump] to properly defend [himself] from false accusations”. . . . He has stated on the record that he “would love” if Your Honor excluded him from the trial for disregarding court orders or engaging in disruptive behavior. . . ." [That, from an earlier filing, while this filing argues:]
...Here, Mr. Trump has been held liable for defamation under the actual malice standard. It would thus be profoundly inequitable to allow him (through his defamatory attacks) to “force a benefit on [Ms. Carroll] against [her] will.” See id. Given the utter absence of good faith and reasonableness in Mr. Trump’s conduct -- and given that his conduct was malicious and intentional rather than negligent or mistaken -- Mr. Trump cannot equitably avail himself of the benefits rule, event to the extent that rule applies under New York law in this setting (which it does not). . . .
Because Mr. Trump’s opening argument and cross-examinations plainly indicated to the jury that Ms. Carroll’s damages should be reduced by the amount of any reputational benefit she received from his defamatory statements, and because that contention rests on a mistaken legal premise, Ms. Carroll respectfully requests that the Court’s jury instructions address this issue. For example, the Court might include the following language in its instructions on defamation damages: “Under the law, the injury (if any) that Mr. Trump caused to Ms. Carroll’s reputation by his defamatory statements is not mitigated by any benefit to her reputation that Mr. Trump may claim that his defamatory statements caused in some parts of the community. You are not to consider any such reputational benefits (if any) in deciding on a damages award in this case.”
In addition, Ms. Carroll would also request that the Court issue an order precluding the defense from making any argument to the jury in summation that is inconsistent with this legal rule. reputational benefit to Ms. Carroll—and, if so, whether he can offset damages on that basis. The answer to that question is clear. As a matter of precedent and equity, the law does not authorize Mr. Trump to defame Ms. Carroll but then minimize the ensuing damages because he involuntarily inflicted a “benefit” on her in the form of support from parts of the community who find his statements abhorrent (or who are otherwise predisposed to disbelieve his attacks).
Ms. Carroll never asked for any “benefit” that Mr. Trump may think that he has forced upon her through his defamatory attacks. If anything, it is offensive for him to persist in his assertions that she should be grateful to him for defaming her. And it is equally absurd to claim that her damages are less substantial just because his unlawful, unwanted, and unwelcome attacks on her reputation provoked sympathy in some parts of the public or drew more attention to Ms. Carroll. If Ms. Carroll suffered harm to her reputation -- which she plainly did -- then she deserves to be fully compensated for that injury. If she somehow benefited in any respect from the President of the United States falsely calling her a liar and a fraud (and threatening and insulting her), the law of New York does not reward Mr. Trump for that collateral result of his own tortious malfeasance.
Because Mr. Trump’s opening argument and cross-examinations plainly indicated to the jury that Ms. Carroll’s damages should be reduced by the amount of any reputational benefit she received from his defamatory statements, and because that contention rests on a mistaken legal premise, Ms. Carroll respectfully requests that the Court’s jury instructions address this issue. For example, the Court might include the following language in its instructions on defamation damages: “Under the law, the injury (if any) that Mr. Trump caused to Ms. Carroll’s reputation by his defamatory statements is not mitigated by any benefit to her reputation that Mr. Trump may claim that his defamatory statements caused in some parts of the community. You are not to consider any such reputational benefits (if any) in deciding on a damages award in this case.” In addition, Ms. Carroll would also request that the Court issue an order precluding the defense from making any argument to the jury in summation that is inconsistent with this legal rule. . . .
Mr. Trump’s claim that his defamatory statements were somehow a form of self-defense, whether he intends that in a political or personal sense, it is meaningless as a legal matter: when a person commits sexual assault and their victim reveals what they did, the law confers no right of self-defense to make defamatory statements aimed at crushing or humiliating the accuser. Giuffre v. Dershowitz, 410 F. Supp. 3d 564, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (explaining under New York law that a finding of constitutional actual malice defeats any self-defense privilege in defamation cases). . . .
Now you know.
Onward -- to a Trump loss, in Manhattan here (perhaps $50 million) -- and in November 2024, at the ballot box!
नमस्ते
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