As of this afternoon, an able Magistrate Judge sitting in Virginia has ruled that a jury "reasonably" could find that the purpose of the generic-delaying agreement -- between Merck and Glenmark, related to the high cholesterol drug called Zetia®. . . was possibly to inhibit lawful price competition, under the Clayton and Sherman Acts.
Rut roh, Scooby. Clearly there will be more here -- most notably, the District Court Judge will need to adopt the Magistrate's report. . . and that may or may not happen.
But this is NOT good news for either company. Here's the latest (a huge 74 page report; so grab it on wi-fi, only) -- and a bit:
. . .Defendants cannot reasonably dispute that the Settlement Agreement restricts competition with Glenmark's generic during exclusivity, the parties vigorously debate the nature of the restrictions. Merck argues that Plaintiffs cannot "label the provision a no-AG agreement that prohibited Merck from selling any authorized generic" because it was allegedly only a "limited exclusive license" reserving to Merck the ability to market a so called branded generic. Merck Mem. (ECF No. 1085, at 32) (emphasis in original). Merck relies on the license provision's exclusion of drugs "sold under the trademark Zetia® or another trademark or trade name" of Merck. Sett. Agr. § 1.14 (ECF No. 398-21, at 6) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs argue that the Settlement Agreement "prohibited Merck from selling a Zetia AG whether under a generic chemical name or a brand name." Pis. ' Opp'n (ECF No. 1156, at 61) . They also contend that even if Merck could sell its branded generic, it had no intention to, and would not have, and thus the license operated identically to a no-AG provision. As discussed below, Plaintiffs have established disputes of material fact regarding whether the provision constituted a no-AG agreement. . . .
Now you know -- and indeed. . . this is truly some very old wine. . . just now, into some newer. . . carafés. Smile. . . .
नमस्ते
No comments:
Post a Comment