Note To Drew Bruce Tipton: The Word "May" Can Never Be Tortured Sufficiently... To Read "Must". End Of The Lesson.

This is mostly just. . . sad, because the Biden Administration has spent two and a half years, now trying to teach a Trump appointed Texas USDC trial judge (supposedly, a college educated man) how to read the English language.

But it is all over now. The Supremes have spoken, six to three. Just as we said, Judge Tipton. . . some words cannot be tortured enough. . . to become their antonyms. Full opinion -- and a bit:

. . . .The problem is that the statute does not say anything like that. The statute says “may.” And “may” does not just suggest discretion, it “clearly connotes” it. Opati, 590 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10) (emphasis in original); see also Jama, 543 U. S., at 346 (“That connotation is particularly apt where, as here, ‘may’ is used in contraposition ‘shall.’”). Congress’s use of the word “may” is therefore inconsistent with respondents’ proposed inference from the statutory structure.

If Congress had intended section 1225(b)(2)(C) to operate as a mandatory cure of any noncompliance with the Government’s detention obligations, it would not have conveyed that intention through an unspoken inference in conflict with the unambiguous, express term “may.” It would surely instead have coupled that grant of discretion with some indication of its sometimes mandatory nature -- perhaps by providing that the Secretary “may return” certain aliens to Mexico, “unless the government fails to comply with its detention obligations, in which case the Secretary must return them.”

The statutory grant of discretion here contains no such caveat, and we will not rewrite it to include one. . . .

Onward to a backyard Japanese steakhouse catered event, under the stars. . . grin.

नमस्ते