Young, Inexperienced USDC (Dallas) Judge Drew Tipton Has Just Had "His Ears Trimmed", By The Fifth Circuit... And That's A Conservatively-Dominated Circuit.

Ahem. Let's call it a "high and tight" haircut, as though he were still "in training", at his old US Marine facility, actually. Grin.

You'll recall that we argued that Tipton (as a 2020 Tangerine appointee, with no real wide-ranging litigation or any prior judicial experience) simply misread every provision of federal law, in this case (at the behest of the Texas State GOP AG).

The Fifth Circuit here essentially tells him to. . . learn to read. That's. . . humiliating, given that the Fifth Circuit cites the same US Supreme Court cases that we urged, and the AUSAs placed before him, all of which contradict his claims to broad powers, here.

Reading is. . . a skill, Judge Tipton. Here's the full fifteen pager, admonishing Judge Tipton, and a bit -- all as we predicted:

. . .Our main concern with the injunction is that we believe these IIRIRA provisions do not eliminate immigration officials’ “broad discretion” to decide who should face enforcement action in the first place. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396. They address a separate question: the custodial status of individuals who are facing removal proceedings or who have been removed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),(c); § 1231(a)(2). To the extent the injunction prevents the Attorney General from relying on the memos to release those who are facing enforcement actions and fall within the mandatory detention provisions -- for example, prisoners with qualifying convictions against whom ICE has lodged a detainer (8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)) or individuals subject to removal orders (id. § 1231(a)(2)) -- we see no basis for upsetting it at this stage as that is what the statutes govern.

The district court’s injunction, however, is not limited to detention decisions of aliens the United States has decided to remove. It is much broader. It enjoins reliance on memos that guide decisions on, among other things, “whether to issue a detainer,” “whether to issue, reissue, serve, file, or cancel a Notice to Appear,” and “whether to stop, question, or arrest a noncitizen.” ICE Memo at 3.

We see the United States likely succeeding on this core foci of the interim enforcement priorities—immigration officials’ ability to prioritize who is subject to investigative and enforcement action in the first place. See Reno, 525 U.S. at 483 (recognizing that law enforcement discretion extends to “initiation or prosecution of various stages in the deportation process,” including the “discretion to abandon the endeavor”). . . .

It is quite telling that neither [Texas or Louisiana] nor the district court have cited a single Supreme Court case requiring law enforcement (state nor federal, criminal nor immigration) to bring charges against an individual or group of individuals. . . .

What is more, in the quarter century that IIRIRA has been on the books, no court at any level previously has held that sections 1226(c)(1) or 1231(a)(2) eliminate immigration officials’ discretion to decide who to arrest or remove. . . . The injunction is STAYED pending appeal in all other respects including the reporting requirements. . . .

In sum, the Fifth Circuit just said that young Judge Tipton simply "made up" this opinion, from whole cloth. This is the starkest rebuke imaginable: a GOP-leaning Fifth Circuit just effectively said he failed a simple statutory reading test. One with clear Supreme Court lamp-posts, to light his path. And he. . . ignored them. Ouch.

Onward now, to a wonderful weekend with the baby girl!

नमस्ते