None of this will be resolved before the election -- but after it, in the highly unlikely event Trump wins, it will offer a clear path to indicting Trump.
More than likely, Trump loses -- and the new DoJ leadership allows rank and file career AUSAs to do their jobs -- and they then agree that the work previously done, for three years, was accurate -- and Ex-Gen. Flynn sees his perjury used to increase his incarceration time.
Which likely leads to his cooperation in naming Trump, as obstructing justice, in the original Mueller probe. Game. Set. Match, either way (and that's the important part!). Here's some of it -- but do go read it all:
. . .[T]he Government’s [Bill Barr's] statement of reasons for seeking dismissal is pretextual. The Government claims there is insufficient evidence to prove materiality and falsity, but even giving it the benefit of every doubt -- and recognizing its prerogative to assess the strength of its own case -- this contention “taxes the credulity of the credulous.” Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Government’s ostensible grounds for seeking dismissal are conclusively disproven by its own briefs filed earlier in this very proceeding. They contradict and ignore this Court’s prior orders, which constitute law of the case. They are riddled with inexplicable and elementary errors of law and fact. And they depart from positions that the Government has taken in other cases. While Rule 48(a) does not require the Government to bare its innermost secrets, it does require a statement of its reasons for dismissal. See Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 620 (explaining that this requirement “prevent[s] abuse of the uncontrolled power of dismissal previously enjoyed by prosecutors”). Leave of court should not be granted when the explanations the Government puts forth are not credible as the real reasons for its dismissal of a criminal charge.
Second, the Court should deny leave because there is clear evidence of a gross abuse of prosecutorial power. Rule 48(a) was designed to “guard against dubious dismissals of criminal cases that would benefit powerful and well-connected defendants.” In other words, the rule empowers courts to protect the integrity of their own proceedings from prosecutors who undertake corrupt, politically motivated dismissals. See id.; see also Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 620-622. That is what has happened here. The Government has engaged in highly irregular conduct to benefit a political ally of the President. The facts of this case overcome the presumption of regularity. The Court should therefore deny the Government’s motion to dismiss, adjudicate any remaining motions, and then sentence the Defendant.
The Court has also asked me to address whether it should issue an order to show cause why Flynn should not be held in criminal contempt for perjury. Flynn has indeed committed perjury in these proceedings, for which he deserves punishment, and the Court has the authority to initiate a prosecution for that crime. I respectfully recommend, however, that the Court not exercise that authority. Rather, it should take Flynn’s perjury into account in sentencing him on the offense to which he has already admitted guilt. . . .
A scorcher, indeed. Do read it all. Onward, grinning. . . at an inky pavement of night, powdered with Milton's stars, tonight. . . .
नमस्ते
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