[U, X2: More "Midnight" Analysis!] Well -- So Much, For That Foolish Gambit....
The government's filing -- opposing Martin's request to move in with his [supposedly] intended, at least until COVID abates -- is due to the able Judge Matsumoto's chambers tonight.
Because Judge Matsumoto's order asked only about Allenwood infractions expressly, and becaue the cell phone matter might be an ongoing investigative / criminal / felony matter [as just one of many examples, into certain guards' conduct, at FCI Ft. Dix], we do not see any mention of it in these 38 pages. [He may also have been given immunity to testify as to how he came by the burner phone -- thus removing that matter, from his own BoP-recited history of discipline. No way to know.] End update.
. . . .Since Shkreli’s incarceration for violating his bail conditions in September 2017, he has committed several disciplinary violations. On May 1, 2018, Shkreli was absent from an assignment, resulting in a loss of email privileges for 30 days. (See Probation Response Memorandum dated April 27, 2020 (“Probation Resp.”) at 2). On May 2, 2018, Shkreli refused a work or program assignment and also refused a direct order, resulting in the loss of visitation privileges for 30 days. (Id.). On June 17, 2019, Shkreli sent mail to another inmate via a third party without authorization, resulting in loss of 15 days’ good time conduct; loss of commissary privileges for three months; and loss of email privileges for one month. (Id.). And on August 2, 2019, Shkreli solicited funds via mail and a phone call that were funneled to another inmate, resulting in a loss of commissary and telephone privileges for three months. . . .
The same rationale that guided the Court’s initial sentence is fully applicable here. Shkreli’s statement that his offense did not involve violence (Shkreli Mot. 16) is both true and irrelevant. The Court’s sentence was imposed with a full understanding of the serious nature of Shkreli’s crimes, as well as the actions he took that led the Court to impose sanctions on him, including remand for violation of his bail conditions for threatening others, and reflected a deep and well-founded concern that a shorter sentence would not properly reflect what he did or how he did it, or deter Shkreli from further illegal conduct. Indeed, Shkreli’s multiple disciplinary infractions while incarcerated — which included, as detailed above, failure to follow a direct order and two separate instances of deliberately circumventing BOP policy and deceiving BOP staff by sending money and mail through other inmates (Probation Resp. at 2) — demonstrate that Shkreli continues to believe that the rules do not apply to him. Reducing Shkreli’s sentence to less than half of what he was sentenced to serve would not in any event be warranted, but is particularly inappropriate in light of this misconduct. Cf., e.g., United States v. Credidio, No. 19 Cr. 111 (PAE), 2020 WL 1644010, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020) (explaining the court denied a request to change a sentence of 33 months’ imprisonment to home confinement for 72-year old defendant at MCC deemed by BOP to be at high risk of COVID-19 complications, because “a lengthy term of imprisonment is required for [the defendant] for all the reasons reviewed at sentencing”); United States v. Lisi, No. 15 Cr. 457 (KPF), 2020 WL 881994, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2020) (denying motion of defendant suffering from, among other things, asthma and high blood pressure; “The sentencing factors weigh heavily against the reduction of [the defendant’s] sentence to time served.”), reconsideration denied, 2020 WL 1331955 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2020). Indeed, this misconduct strongly suggests that Shkreli cannot be trusted to follow any conditions of supervised release, including any that might be imposed to mitigate the risk of him not taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to commit additional fraud. . . .
With respect to his allegation that he suffers from asthma, Shkreli did not report this alleged condition to the Probation Office prior to sentencing; did not tell the Court of such an alleged condition in connection with sentencing; did not report that he allegedly had asthma to the BOP at any time; is not being treated for asthma at the BOP; did not claim that he suffered from asthma in the BOP Petition; and the government is unaware of any medical records of any kind to support his claim (and there are none in his BOP medical file). In short, his claim is both “suspiciously coincidental” and “wholly unsubstantiated”. . . .
Second, to the extent the Court chooses to reach Shkreli’s argument that he will allegedly use his time after he is released to “develop[] a potential cure for COVID-19” that will “potentially help those who are suffering” (Shkreli Mot. 17-18), the Court should reject it. As an initial matter, he offers no authority for the Court to conclude that such an alleged plan is a basis for release, or how it distinguishes him from any other defendant who claims that society would be better off if he were released because he will purportedly devote himself to its betterment. In any event, Shkreli’s contention that he must be released to work on a “potential cure” is belied by his own submission. Despite his current incarceration, Shkreli claims he has already “devoted countless hours to developing a potential cure,” provided the content of that work on a public web page and to a private pharmaceutical company, and communicated with that company about developing a treatment based on that work. . . .
Shkreli has no formal scientific training and no experience working a laboratory setting, and he does not explain why he cannot continue to develop and discuss any ideas he may have about COVID-19 from prison, as he has. Moreover, as Probation observes, Shkreli’s “belief that he can develop a cure for COVID-19, something that has so far eluded the best medical and scientific minds in the world working around the clock, is not only a practice in wild and completely unfounded speculation, but is indicative of the same kind of delusional self-aggrandizing behavior that underlies the defendant’s conduct in the commission of the instant offense.” (Probation Resp. at 2). The government agrees. . . .
Now you know. Onward -- in the meantime, do go be excellent -- to one another. नमस्ते
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