It weighs in at over 120 pages, but is precisely as we described the state of the law to be -- in a reality-grounded world.
Indeed. . . it is a well-reasoned opinion -- pointing directly to the specific case we mentioned, as the touchstone. [Not that it really needs to be said, but Judge N. Rao's verbose, meandering dissent. . . is as full of wing-nuttery, as it is of illogic. Quite an achievement, that.]
. . . .First, the case law is quite stingy in describing what impermissible congressional law enforcement might look like in practice. The Supreme Court has framed its primary instruction on this point in the negative: the fact that an investigation might expose criminal conduct does not transform a legislative inquiry into a law-enforcement endeavor. As the Court explained in Sinclair, Congress’s “authority . . . to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is not abridged” merely “because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use” in criminal prosecutions. 279 U.S. at 295. “Nor [is] it a valid objection,” said the Court in McGrain, that an investigation “might possibly disclose crime or wrongdoing.” 273 U.S. at 179–80. Indeed, thanks to the Court’s clarity on this matter, all parties here agree that “a permissible legislative investigation does not become impermissible merely because it might expose law violations. . . .”
Onward. Of course, Trump will appeal to the Supremes. Ugh.
नमस्ते
No comments:
Post a Comment