[U] More Of the Current Federal Law -- As Flores-Protective Filings Really Gather Steam...

UPDATED @ 6 AM Saturday: Very late last night, Eastern time (since it was filed on the West Coast), the long-acting Flores legal team, proper -- filed their answers to the Trump administration. Theirs is a more succinct version of the ACLU position, below. Do read it all, at this link (as a PDF file). Also late last night, the City of Chicago moved to join the lawsuit, along with several other cities which have so-called city-wide "welcoming ordinances" -- to assure people missing documents that they won't be prosecuted for reporting a crime (solely due to their undocumented status). Trump has essentially no chance of prevailing here.

This newest memo of law does ALSO address the fact that the Court in Flores has ALREADY ruled that Trump cannot lawfully avoid the state licensing requirements, for facilities that might house children. My understanding is that none of the Trump-donor run private prisons presently possess state-issued child care licenses. Trump loses. Now. . . go march today, in any city of size, near you. [End, updated portion.]

Just as we said it would, the ACLU just filed an excellent amicus brief, in Flores.

Here it is -- full 20 page PDF file -- and. . . I simply cannot resist!

Mr. Readler is positively. . . dead in the water, here -- I'll quote the best parts:

. . . .Even assuming the government’s factual claims were correct -- and they are not -- its ex parte motion should be rejected. General deterrence is not a permissible purpose for family detention because this form of detention is civil rather than criminal in nature. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held exactly that, in the context of family detention, in RILR v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2015). Based on controlling Supreme Court precedent, RILR concluded that the detention of individuals for the purpose of deterring the migration of others to the United States raises serious due process concerns and violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The Due Process Clause and the INA permit detention based only on individualized characteristics such as flight risk and danger to the community. Where the government lacks an individualized basis to detain, incarceration in this context is impermissible. See RILR, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 186-90. . . .

Moreover, the government itself agreed not to detain families based on general deterrence as a condition of dissolving the RILR injunction and administratively closing the case. Thus, even if the government were correct that Flores and this Court’s July 2015 Order have impacted migration patterns, it still would be prohibited -- by the Constitution, the immigration laws, and its own policy -- from imprisoning families to deter other migrants from coming to the United States. . . .

In any event, the government has failed to justify its interest in deterrence here. It is unclear why the government has any legitimate interest in deterring the families who primarily benefit from the release provisions of the Flores Agreement -- namely, asylum seekers whom the immigration authorities have found to have credible asylum claims that must be heard in full immigration court hearings inside the United States. The government has failed to provide any probative evidence either of the “migratory crisis” supposedly precipitated by Flores and this Court’s July 2015 Order, or that long-term family detention -- if permitted by this Court -- would effectively deter migrants from seeking asylum in the United States. In short, the government has failed to show that modification of the Flores Agreement is warranted. . . .

Second, the government’s motion appears to assume that if the Flores Agreement did not require that children be released promptly from custody, then the government could subject the parents and children to prolonged detention pending completion of their removal proceedings, and thereby avoid the need for family separation. See, e.g., Gov’t Br. 5. However, the government may not subject families to such categorical detention. Instead, the Due Process Clause, the INA, and the INA’s implementing regulations all require that the government make an individualized determination that detention is warranted based on flight risk and danger. . . .

As set forth below, the government’s claims are factually incorrect and do not remotely show a “significant change in circumstances” warranting extraordinary relief under Rule 60(b)(5). See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992). . . . But even if the government had shown a significant change in circumstances -- which it has not -- it still would be prohibited from deploying family detention for the purpose underlying its ex parte motion: that is, to deter other migrants from traveling to the United States.

This is made clear by the district court’s preliminary injunction ruling in RILR v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2015). See also Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2016). . . .

Onward; MARCH tomorrow (we want 10 million souls, nationwide)! Be excellent to all of good will, even if you disagree with them, or their methods -- so long as they are. . . non-violent.

नमस्ते