Even though the final clause of of the below Section 10.4 -- at subsection 10.4.3 -- specifically disclaims control, there is a reasonable case to be made that Sanofi-Aventis tonight, through crafty negative covenantry, possesses at least a "veto right" -- as to most important business matters concerning the Intervet franchises, businesses that are (at least nominally) still now owned by Schering-Plough (and to be owned by New Merck, if the reverse merger is consummated). Surprisingly, this veto, or negative control, in favor of Sanofi, now exists over a series of businesses worth, by some accounts, over $9 billion. Any sale, divestiture, or other rearranging of any asset or liability that comprises more than one-half of one percent, in most cases, or one percent (in some other cases) is a "trip-wire" -- creating default remedies in favor of Sanofi-Aventis. The tightness of the guardrails is actually rather astonishing. These clauses are common in multinational M&A settings, but usually provide much wider dollar discretion to a target of Intervet's size, scope and scale. Fascinating.
Take a look -- again, a link to the full "call option" agreement is here, at the SEC's EDGAR window:
. . . .10.4 Conduct of the Intervet/Schering-Plough Entities
10.4.1 Except (i) to the extent required by applicable Law or the regulations or requirements of any stock exchange or regulatory organization applicable to Sellers, Sellers’ Subsidiaries and the Intervet Schering-Plough ("I/SP") Entities and their Subsidiaries, (ii) as otherwise permitted or contemplated by this Agreement or the Related Agreements, (iii) as set forth in Schedule 10.4, or (iv) as consented to in writing by Sanofi-Aventis (which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned or delayed), during the period from the date hereof until the earlier of (A) the Closing Date or (B) the termination of this Agreement in accordance with Article 14 hereof, Sellers shall, and shall cause each of their Subsidiaries (including the I/SP Entities and their Subsidiaries) to, conduct the businesses and operations of the I/SP Business in all material respects in the Ordinary Course, and to the extent consistent therewith, Sellers shall, and shall cause each of their Subsidiaries (including the I/SP Entities and their Subsidiaries) to, use their respective reasonable efforts to (1) preserve the I/SP Entities’ and their respective Subsidiaries’ existing assets and properties, (2) preserve the I/SP Business’ business organization intact and maintain the I/SP Business’ existing relations and goodwill with customers, suppliers, distributors, creditors and lessors, and (3) comply in all material respects with Laws applicable to the I/SP Business.
10.4.2 Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, except (w) to the extent required by applicable Law or the regulations or requirements of any stock exchange or regulatory organization applicable to Sellers, Sellers’ Subsidiaries and the I/SP Entities, (x) as otherwise permitted or contemplated by this Agreement or the Related Agreements, (y) as set forth in Schedule 10.4, or (z) as consented to in writing by Sanofi-Aventis (which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned or delayed), during the period from the date hereof to the Closing Date, Sellers shall cause each of the I/SP Entities and their Subsidiaries not to:
(i) modify or amend in any material respect any of the organizational documents of any of the I/SP Entities or their Subsidiaries;
(ii) issue, sell or otherwise transfer any Equity Securities of any of the I/SP Entities or any of their Subsidiaries (other than issuances, sales or other transfers to the I/SP Entities or any wholly-owned Subsidiary of an I/SP Entity);
(iii) split, combine, redeem or reclassify any Equity Securities of any of the I/SP Entities;
(iv) permit any of the I/SP Entities or any of their respective Subsidiaries to incur or suffer to exist any Indebtedness in excess of $50 million in the aggregate except (x) for working capital borrowings incurred in the Ordinary Course, or (y) as listed in Schedule 10.4.2(iv);
(v) enter into any Contract that would prohibit any of the I/SP Entities or any of its Subsidiaries, after the Closing, from competing in any line of business or with any Person in any geographic area, except for such prohibitions that would not, individually or in the aggregate, reasonably be expected to be materially adverse to the I/SP Business;
(vi) other than acquisitions (a) listed in Schedule 10.4.2(vi) or (b) not in excess of $10 million individually or $20 million in the aggregate, permit any of the I/SP Entities or any of their respective Subsidiaries to acquire any business by merger, consolidation or otherwise;
(vii) divest, sell or otherwise dispose of, or encumber any material asset of the I/SP Entities or their Subsidiaries outside of the Ordinary Course (other than as permitted by subsection (ii) above) except (a) as listed in Schedule 10.4.2(vii), (b) for transactions involving assets of the I/SP Entities or their Subsidiaries having a value no greater than $20 million in the aggregate for all such transfers, or (c) in connection with any waiver, release, assignment, settlement, compromise of litigation otherwise permitted under this Agreement;
(viii) permit any of the I/SP Entities or any of their respective Subsidiaries to adopt a plan or agreement of complete or partial liquidation, dissolution, or recapitalization;
(ix) permit any of the I/SP Entities or any of their respective Subsidiaries to enter into or adopt any Plan, or amend any I/SP Entities Plan other than in the Ordinary Course consistent with past practice;
(x) increase the rate of compensation, commission, bonus, or other direct or indirect remuneration payable, or agree to pay, conditionally or otherwise, any bonus, incentive, retention, change in control payment or other compensation, retirement, welfare, fringe or severance benefit or vacation pay, to or in respect of any employee, officer or director of any of the I/SP Entities or any of their respective Subsidiaries, except (a) in the Ordinary Course or (b) to the extent required by any Plan disclosed in Schedule 8.17.1;
(xi) materially delay or accelerate the payment of any account payable or other Liability of the I/SP Business other than in the Ordinary Course, materially delay or accelerate the collection of any account receivable or other amount owed to the I/SP Entities and their Subsidiaries relating to the I/SP Business other than in the Ordinary Course, or directly or indirectly encourage or require agents, distributors or other purchasers of products from the I/SP Business to purchase or commit to purchase such products in volumes or in accordance with an order or delivery schedule other than in the Ordinary Course;
(xii) make, incur or authorize any individual capital expenditures or commitment for capital expenditures in connection with the I/SP Business in excess of $20 million individually or $100 million in the aggregate;
(xiii) pay any dividend (including interim dividends or other similar forms of distribution), other than dividends or distributions that would be reflected in the calculation of the I/SP Value (as defined in the Call Option Agreement) pursuant to the Call Option Agreement;
(xiv) enter into new agreements, or modify any existing agreements, between Schering-Plough or its Affiliates, on the one hand, and the I/SP Entities or its Subsidiaries, on the other hand, that would continue to be effective following the Closing unless such agreements are substantially on an arm’s-length basis, other than customary agreements and intracompany arrangements for items such as cash management, tax sharing, data sharing and other similar ordinary course purposes with Schering-Plough or its Affiliates; or
(xv) authorize, agree, resolve or consent to any of the foregoing.
10.4.3 Nothing contained in this Agreement shall give to Sanofi-Aventis, directly or indirectly, rights to control or direct the operations of any of the I/SP Entities, their respective Subsidiaries prior to the Closing. Prior to the Closing, each of the I/SP Entities and their Subsidiaries, as applicable, shall exercise, consistent with the terms and conditions of this Agreement, complete control and supervision of its operations. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, no consent of Sanofi-Aventis shall be required with respect to any matter set forth in this Section 10.4 or elsewhere in this Agreement to the extent that the requirement of such consent would violate or conflict with applicable Law. . . .
Whew. That's quite a bit of de facto veto power, or negative control, of a series of businesses worth, by some accounts, over $9 billion. And $50 million or $100 million is a trip-wire threshold amount? Yikes. Sanofi is effectively now running this Intervet show.
6 comments:
Pretty wordy, but I don't see it as a huge deal. Typical concept -- SA doesn't want ISP to do anything stupid (or even anything all that important) while the option is still in play. SA clearly thinks the option will lead to a "new" Merial combining most of Merial and ISP. I'm more skeptical -- the overlapping product lines are pretty extensive, and Merck can basically pay off SA if it looks like the FTC will have a problem with the idea.
Right. I am saying "the loud part softly", here, above.
Listen to what an FTC/DoJ staffer hears:
See, these agreements -- fairly construed, together -- begin to look like an attempt to carve up the Animal Health market, by what are now competitors.
And those are attempts the Sherman and Clayton Acts generally frown upon.
My audience on this piece is the hard-working, but overworked, career staff lawyers -- of the FTC's (and DoJ's) Antitrust division.
Namaste
How would the FTC allow this? Essentially S-A wants to side-step the FTC or circumvent US anti-trust and anti-competition laws, correct?
In the EU, Merial and Intervet have almost the same product line. In the US, almost all vaccines are duplicates, even some Pharmas.
This is not to mention the 2-3K people that would be "synergized" in the EU and USA.
If this company combines you will see one huge AH company (worth 15 billion) and one smaller one - that being Pfizer AH (about 6 billion) with about 5 at 2 billion (700 million in sales). Talk about a complete monopoly.
wow, have you seen that SGP chart lately???
good heavens!
I don't see the 15B, but your point is taken. ISP is at 3B, Merial at 2.7B.Pfizer/Wyeth is at 3.4B. But I don't think the option agreement, which expires fairly quickly following the close of Merck/SP doesn't "circumvent" the FTC Hart-
Scott-Rodino process. If SA exercises its option to create a new Merial, the FTC will still need to approve that. And given the overlaps, that's where the problem will be.
Okay -- as to the last Anonymous comment: Let's get the figures agreed, first.
Schering-Plough's Intervet (alone) was, according to several financial press sources, likely to fetch $8 to $9 billion, while the auction was proceeding "in secret" -- in June and July of 2009. Next, and importantly -- as an arms'-length bargain -- Sanofi has ALREADY agreed to pay $9.25 billion, for Intervet, if it exercises the option.
Finally, Sanofi has agreed to pay $4 billion for HALF of Merial -- the half it does not already own.
So, ALL of Merial is at least $7 billion, in value, even if we liberally assume that $1 billion of the $4 billion represents the "control premium/synergy value" of owning the whole Merial enterprise, rather than just a half of it.
That -- the $7B plus $9B is actually $16 billion -- is where (I think) the other commenter's figures originate (at "$15 billion"). The general point remains the same -- it is (and would be) a mammoth force in Animal Health.
With me so far? Good.
Now, Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any company (of a certain size) from acquiring another company (in any transaction of a certain size) when the deal might reasonably result in "a substantial reduction in competition" -- it is an "effects" test.
While you are right, the FTC/DoJ will certainly get a chance to review this deal, should Sanofi ultimately elect to exercise the option, my concern is about what happens between now and then. There is a fairly high probability that the Schering-Plough Merck reverse merger will not close in 2009. It may well close in January or February of 2010. That means these current contractual "tie-ups" (or prohibitions, on acts of outright competition) will exist until June of 2010, as the 100 days on the option sorts itself out.
That amounts to almost one full year -- a year during which Sanofi/Merial is assured that it can effectively veto any action of any real size (of more than one-percent of Intervet's size), that might hurt Merial's emerging positions. Of course, it is all dressed up, with the lipstick of ostensibly not hurting the value of Intervet's business -- but Sanofi/Merial need not explain itself -- it need only say "no".
Next, an arbitration would ensue, about whether the refusal to consent was "unreasonable". Net, net -- it will allow Merial to delay Intervet's proposed action, essentially running out the clock -- until the game is over, and the Sanofi option is then fully-exerciseable. [Even if Sanofi never exercises the option, it may effectively hobble Intervet's ability to compete against Merial.]
This could be something as simple as New Merck/Schering voting a pay increase, or incentive compensation enhancement, to all Intervet sales people -- to drive penetration by Intervet, into Merial territories.
It could be something as serious as Intervet deciding to go head-to-head against Merial, in any one of about 40 product categories.
All Sanofi/Merial need do, is cite Section 10.4, waggle its finger, and "poof(!)" -- New Merck's Intervet (or old Schering's Intervet) will have to take a seat on the bench -- rather than compete -- in the game.
By June 30, 2010, Merial may have cemented enough of a lead in its core markets, that Intervet will never be a serious threat.
That is the arguable Clayton Act Section 7 effect of letting this deal putter along, as is -- blithely relying on a future Hart Scott review -- to sort out the effect of the EXERCISE of the option -- as opposed to the effect of the EXISTENCE of it.
The sheer size of these businesses, plus the very tight guardrails on permitted actions by Schering-Plough's Intervet, for what may amount to nearly a year, lead me to see a clear Clayton Act "anti-competitive effect" -- in the mere GRANTING of this option.
I think I'll clean this up, and make it a new post. So -- in sum, I agree with the anonymous commenter, above who decried the emerging "monopoly power" here.
Namaste
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