This is the latest (filed tonight) in the series of papers sorting out who should serve as lead plaintiff in the federal suits challenging the reverse merger. Click that immediately-preceding link for background, but the so-called Institutional Investors Group argues that the size of its stockholdings, when compared to the individual plaintiffs, makes it better able to serve, tonight -- and I think I concur:
. . . .the Congressional intent of the PSLRA should not be completely lost. “[I]nstitutional investors [] with large amounts at stake will represent the interests of the plaintiff class more effectively than class members with small amounts at stake.” In re Cendant Corp., 264 F.3d 201, 264 (3d Cir. 2001), citing H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-327, at 34 (1995). Moreover, Delaware courts, which lead the nation in merger-related shareholder class actions, recognize that the relative stockholdings of litigants should be weighed by courts facing competing motions for lead plaintiff and lead counsel. See Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Service Company, LLC, Civ. No. 19575, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 89, *4 (Del. Ch. 2002) (courts should weigh the following 6 factors: (1) “quality of the pleading[s],” (2) “the relative economic stakes of the competing litigants,” (3) “vigorous[]” prosecution, (4) “absence of [] conflicts”, (5) “enthusiasm and vigor,” and (6) “competence of counsel”). . . .
Of course, as ever, more to come.
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